

Marc C. Cote, WSBA #39824
Sean M. Phelan, WSBA #27866
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Class
FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS LLP
705 Second Avenue, Suite 1200
Seattle, Washington 98104
Telephone: (206) 682-6711

[Additional Counsel Appear on Signature Page]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

JUAN BARRIENTOS MARTINEZ and
JESUS MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AUVIL FRUIT COMPANY, INC.

Defendant.

NO. 2:16-cv-0356-RMP

**PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT**

Noted for Hearing: October 9, 2018
at 1:30 p.m.
With Oral Argument

Class Action

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

1

2

3 I. INTRODUCTION 1

4 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 2

5 III. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 6

6 A. The Settlement satisfies the criteria for final approval 7

7 1. The strength of Plaintiffs’ case 7

8 2. The risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation 9

9 3. The risk of maintaining class action status through trial 11

10 4. The amount offered in settlement 11

11 5. The extent of discovery completed and stage of
proceedings 13

12 6. The experience of counsel 13

13 7. The presence of a governmental participant 14

14 8. The reaction of Class Members 14

15 B. Class Members received the best notice practicable 15

16 C. This Court should approve late claims submitted
by October 31, 2018 17

17 D. The proposed service awards are reasonable 17

18 E. The settlement administration expenses award is reasonable 18

19

20

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

F. The payment of attorneys’ fees at the benchmark level is fair and reasonable.....19

1. Class Counsel’s fee request is reasonable under the percentage-of-recovery approach21

2. A lodestar cross-check confirms the requested fee is reasonable.....27

i. Counsel have spent a reasonable number of hours on this case.....28

ii. Counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable30

iii. A lodestar multiplier is appropriate.....33

G. Reimbursement of Class Counsel’s litigation costs is reasonable36

IV. CONCLUSION38

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page No.

STATE CASES

1

2

3

4 *Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co.*,
100 Wn.2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983)28, 31, 32

5

6 *Bowles v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys.*,
121 Wn.2d 52, 847 P.2d 440 (1993)*passim*

7 *Broyles v. Thurston County*,
147 Wn. App. 409, 195 P.3d 985 (2008)32

8

9 *Carranza v. Dovex Fruit Co.*,
416 P.3d 1205 (2018)8, 9, 10, 14

10 *Forbes v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. W.*,
170 Wn.2d 157, 240 P.3d 790 (2010)25

11

12 *Lopez Demetrio v. Sakuma Brothers Farms, Inc.*,
183 Wn.2d 649, 355 P.3d 258 (2015)9, 10, 24

13 *Lyzanchuk v. Yakima Ranches Owners Ass’n, Phase II, Inc.*,
73 Wn. App. 1, 866 P.2d 695 (1994).....20

14

15 *Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors*,
168 Wn.2d 664, 230 P.3d 583 (2010)11

16 *Steele v. Lundgren*,
96 Wn. App. 773, 982 P.2d 619 (1999)31

FEDERAL CASES

17

18 *Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Servs.*,
523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2008)30

19

20 *Craft v. Cnty. Of San Bernardino*,
624 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2008).....21, 26, 35

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Di Giacamo v. Plains All Am. Pipeline,
No. Civ. A. H-99-4137, 2001 WL 34633373 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2001) ...36

Gates v. Deukmejian,
987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1992)31

Hageman v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
No. CV 13-50-BLG-RWA,
2015 WL 9855925 (D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2015).....25

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988)7

Hillson v. Kelly Servs. Inc.,
No. 2:15-cv-10803, 2017 WL 3446596 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2017).....35

Ikuseghan v. Multicare Health Sys.,
Case No. C14-5539 BHS, 2016 WL 4363198
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2016).....21, 25

In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.,
654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011)20, 30, 33, 34

In re Gypsum Antitrust Cases,
565 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1977)17

In re Immune Response Sec. Litig.,
497 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2007)37

In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig.,
913 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Cal. 1996)37

In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.,
213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000)13, 25

In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig.,
618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010)16

1 *In re Omnivision Tech., Inc.*,
559 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2008).....13, 24

2

3 *In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.*,
779 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015)6, 7, 30

4 *In re Pacific Enterprises Sec. Litig.*,
47 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1995)25

5

6 *In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Secs. Litig.*,
19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994).33

7 *Johnson v. Fujitsu Tech. & Bus. of Am., Inc.*,
No. 16-CV-03698-NC, 2018 WL 2183253 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018)35

8

9 *Maley v. Del Global Techs. Corp.*,
186 F. Supp. 2d 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)36

10 *McCulloch v. Baker Hughes Inteq Drilling Fluids, Inc.*,
No. 1:16-cv-00157-DAD-JLT, 2017 WL 5665848
11 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2017).....35

12 *Moreno v. City of Sacramento*,
534 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008)28, 29, 30

13

14 *Pan v. Qualcomm Inc.*,
No. 16-CV-01885-JLS-DHB,
2017 WL 3252212 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2017).....35

15

16 *Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*,
255 F.R.D. 537 (W.D. Wash. 2009).....14, 15, 18

17 *Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.*,
563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009)13, 17

18

19 *Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc.*,
No. 1:05CV0484 DLB, 2007 WL 3492841 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2007).....26

20

1 *Singer v. Becton Dickinson & Co.*,
 No. 08-CV-821-IEG (BLM),
 2 2010 WL 2196104 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 1, 2010).....26

3 *Staton v. Boeing Co.*,
 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir 2003)19

4
 5 *Steiner v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc.*,
 248 F. App’x 780 (9th Cir. 2007).....35

6 *Tadepalli v. Uber Techs., Inc.*,
 No. 15-CV-04348-MEJ, 2016 WL 1622881 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016)15

7
 8 *Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co.*,
 901 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1995).....35

9 *Vandervort v. Balboa Capital Corp.*,
 8 F. Supp. 3d 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2014).....26

10
 11 *Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc.*,
 266 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Cal. 2010).....26

12 *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*,
 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002)*passim*

13
 14 *Zients v. LaMorte*,
 459 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1972)17

15
 16 **OTHER AUTHORITIES**

17 *Manual for Complex Litigation* (Fourth)
 (4th ed. 2004).....7, 22

18 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, *Newberg on Class Actions*
 (4th ed. 2002).....25

19
 20

I. INTRODUCTION

1
2 Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final approval of the
3 class action settlement they reached with Auvil Fruit Company, Inc. (“Auvil” or
4 “Defendant”). The settlement requires Auvil to pay \$2,500,000 for a non-
5 reversionary settlement fund for the benefit of the Class, to pay 4.5% of all piece-
6 rate earnings for each worker on a going forward basis beginning January 1, 2018
7 to account for non-productive work time, to revise its timekeeping policies to
8 ensure compliance with the law, and to provide employment rights training for all
9 supervisors and managers.

10 The settlement is an excellent result for the Class. It appears to be the
11 largest wage and hour class action settlement for farm workers in Washington
12 state history. Qualified Class Members will receive payments for over 100% of
13 their actual damages. The reaction of the Class has been positive, as many Class
14 Members have submitted claim forms, no Member has objected, and only one
15 Member has requested exclusion.

16 Settlement Administrator Simpluris, Inc. (“Simpluris”) successfully
17 implemented the notice program, providing notice by mail to almost 90% of the
18 Settlement Class in addition to text messages to Class Members and a Facebook
19 campaign. Class Counsel also purchased radio advertisements about the
20 settlement on three Spanish-language radio stations in the region where Class

1 Members work. Simpluris has fielded calls from Class Members and maintained
2 a settlement website through which Class Members can submit an online claim
3 form, access case documents, and stay apprised of deadlines. The multi-faceted
4 notice program is the best notice practicable under the circumstances to reach the
5 migrant and seasonal workers who comprise the Class, and it satisfies due
6 process.

7 Plaintiffs ask that the Court grant final approval of the settlement by: (1)
8 finding it to be fair, adequate, and reasonable; (2) determining that adequate
9 notice was provided to the Class; and (3) approving the requested attorneys' fees,
10 costs, settlement administration expenses, and Class representative service
11 awards.

12 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

13 On May 15, 2018, this Court granted preliminary approval of the
14 settlement. ECF No. 53. The settlement requires Auvil to pay \$2,500,000 (the
15 "Common Fund Payment") to establish a non-revisionary settlement fund for the
16 benefit of the Class, which is made up of the approximately 4,295 farm workers
17 whom Auvil has identified as Class Members in this action. *See* ECF No. 48 at
18 19 (Settlement Agreement § III.C.1); Declaration of Marc C. Cote in Support of
19 Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement ("Cote Decl."),
20 ¶¶ 3–5.

1 Under the Settlement Agreement, Class Members who submit Claim Forms
2 by the deadline will be “Qualified Class Members” and will receive a pro rata
3 share of the Net Class Fund. ECF No. 48 at 21 (§§ III.A.11, III.E.4-5). If
4 approved by the Court, Plaintiffs will each receive a service award of \$10,000
5 from the Common Fund Payment. *Id.* at 22 (§ III.I). In addition, the Settlement
6 Administrator will receive a Settlement Administration Expenses Award of up to
7 \$49,000. *Id.* at 24 (§ III.J.10). If approved, Class Counsel will receive a
8 benchmark 25% attorney fee award and a costs payment of \$10,066.23. *See id.* at
9 22 (§ III.H); Cote Decl., ¶ 28. The remaining amount, approximately
10 \$1,795,933.77 (the “Net Class Fund”), will be distributed directly to Qualified
11 Class Members. *Id.* at 21 (§§ III.E.4-5).

12 Each Qualified Class Member’s Settlement Award will be the Member’s
13 aggregate proportional share of the Net Class Fund based on his or her hours
14 worked in piecework activities. *See id.* Qualified Class Members are expected to
15 receive payments of between approximately 132% and 151% of their actual
16 damages. Cote Decl., ¶ 6. The average payment per Qualified Class member is
17 expected to be over \$1,000. Declaration of Cassandra Cita Regarding Notice and
18 Settlement Administration (“Simpluris Decl.”), ¶ 17; Cote Decl., ¶ 7.

19 After the Court granted preliminary approval, Simpluris commenced the
20 notice program. Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C.

1 § 1715, Auvil sent notice of the settlement to the United States Attorney General
2 and the attorneys' general of all states in which any Class Member resides on
3 May 11, 2018. *See* Cote Decl., ¶ 8.

4 Simpluris initially mailed 4,136 court-approved settlement notices to Class
5 Members. Simpluris Decl., ¶ 7. Prior to mailing, the addresses were updated
6 using a National Change of Address (“NCOA”) database. *Id.* ¶¶ 6–7. Simpluris
7 received 687 notices returned by the USPS as undeliverable, five of which had a
8 forwarding address, and Simpluris performed a “skip trace” search and found new
9 addresses for the other 682 returned notices. *Id.* ¶ 8. Simpluris then re-mailed
10 notices to the updated addresses. *Id.* As of August 22, 2018, only 370 notices
11 (about 10% of the initial mailings) remain undeliverable. *Id.*

12 Simpluris also created a settlement website that contains the full settlement
13 notice, in Spanish and English, as well as an online claim form Class Members
14 can use to make a claim. Simpluris Decl., ¶ 10. Simpluris also manually sent text
15 messages with a link to the settlement website to each Class Member for whom
16 Auvil possessed a phone number. *Id.* ¶ 9. In addition, Simpluris publicized the
17 settlement on Facebook, with advertisements targeted to farm workers in the
18 areas of Wenatchee, Chelan, Orondo, Brewster, Quincy, and Vantage. *Id.* ¶ 11.
19 Auvil also posted a copy of the notice at each of its orchards and at its offices and
20 collected completed claim forms at its offices. *See* ECF No. 48 at 34.

1 Class Counsel also purchased radio advertisements regarding the
2 Settlement for the following Spanish-language radio stations in the areas where
3 Auvil workers reside: KOZI Community Radio 93.5 FM, 100.9 FM, & 1230 AM
4 (Sunday Spanish program), La Nueva KWLN 103.3 & 92.1 FM, KZUS FM 92.3
5 & 92.9, and KZML 95.9. Cote Decl., ¶ 9.

6 Finally, Simpluris established a toll-free telephone number dedicated to
7 answering calls from Class Members. *Id.* ¶ 3. In Simpluris’s opinion, the notice
8 program is the best notice practicable. *Id.* ¶ 13.

9 The reaction of Settlement Class Members to this Settlement has been
10 positive so far. *See* Cote Decl., ¶ 10. The deadline for opting out of or objecting
11 to the Settlement is September 10, 2018. To date, no Class Members have
12 objected to the Settlement, and only one has opted out. *Id.* ¶¶ 10–11; Simpluris
13 Decl., ¶¶ 14–15. The one exclusion request is from an individual who filed a
14 lawsuit against Auvil involving similar claims after this lawsuit was filed and
15 settled the lawsuit individually. Simpluris Decl., ¶ 14; Cote Decl., ¶ 11.

16 Simpluris has received 1,715 Claim Forms, of which 1,327 have already
17 been validated. Simpluris Decl., ¶ 16. Class Members have submitted 388 Claim
18 Forms via the settlement website, and Simpluris is in the process of verifying the
19 validity of those online Claim Forms. *Id.* Thus, the current claims rate is
20 between 32% (validated claims) and 41% (all claims). *See id.* In wage and hour

1 class actions, the claims rate typically falls within the range of 10% to 30% of the
2 settlement class. *Id.* The typical rate is likely even lower for cases involving
3 migrant or seasonal workers like this one.

4 On August 16, Auvil notified Class Counsel that the company had
5 inadvertently omitted approximately 159 Class Members from the Class list
6 provided for settlement administration. Cote Decl., ¶ 4. Using data received
7 from Auvil, Class Counsel quickly compiled a spreadsheet with contact
8 information and estimated awards for these individuals and provided it to
9 Simpluris. *Id.* On August 21, Simpluris issued supplemental notice to these
10 Class Members by mail and text message. Simpluris Decl., ¶ 12. Auvil has
11 agreed to pay any additional notice and administration costs related to these 159
12 Class Members in excess of the \$49,000 anticipated in the Settlement Agreement.
13 Cote Decl., ¶ 4. To ensure these Class Members have a reasonable opportunity to
14 submit Claim Forms, Plaintiffs propose processing and paying claims even if
15 Claim Forms are submitted after the September 10 deadline.

16 III. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

17 This Court has broad discretion to approve a proposed settlement. *In re*
18 *Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F.3d 934, 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2015)
19 (noting standard of review is “clear abuse of discretion” and appellate court’s
20 review is “extremely limited”). When considering a motion for final approval of

1 a class action settlement, a court must determine whether the settlement is
2 “fundamentally fair.” *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir.
3 1988). A settlement merits final approval, when “the interests of the class are
4 better served by the settlement than by further litigation.” *Manual for Complex*
5 *Litigation* (Fourth) (“MCL 4th”) § 21.61, at 309 (2004).

6 **A. The Settlement satisfies the criteria for final approval.**

7 In deciding whether to grant final approval, courts consider several factors,
8 including: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense,
9 complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining
10 class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5)
11 the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the
12 experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a government participant;
13 and (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. *In re Online*
14 *DVD-Rental*, 779 F.3d at 944. All of these factors support settlement approval
15 here.

16 1. The strength of Plaintiffs’ case.

17 Plaintiffs continue to believe they have a strong case but are also pragmatic
18 in their awareness of the risks inherent in litigation. At the time the case settled,
19 the Washington Supreme Court had not yet decided whether agricultural
20 employers like Auvil were obligated to separately pay piece-rate workers for time

1 spent in non-piece-rate activities, or whether they could average piece-rate pay
2 across the week and satisfy minimum wage compliance by paying no less than a
3 workweek average of minimum wage. By entering the settlement, both sides
4 determined a compromise resolution on that issue was the best approach.

5 On May 10, the Washington Supreme Court issued its opinion on the
6 separate pay issue in *Carranza v. Dovex Fruit Co.*, 416 P.3d 1205 (2018). In a 5-
7 4 decision, the Court held that “Washington law require[s] agricultural employers
8 to pay pieceworkers for time spent performing activities outside of piece-rate
9 picking work (e.g., ‘Piece Rate Down Time’ and similar work).” *Id.* at 1207–08.

10 The Court held that “agricultural workers may be paid on a piece-rate basis only
11 for the hours in which they are engaged in piece-rate picking work” and that
12 “[t]ime spent performing activities outside the scope of piece-rate picking work
13 must be compensated on a separate hourly basis.” *Id.* Although the *Carranza*
14 plaintiffs’ argument on this issue was successful, counsel for Dovex Fruit
15 Company (the same lawyers who represent Auvil here) continue to assert that
16 Dovex need not pay for the non-productive work time for which the plaintiffs
17 seek compensation. Cote Decl., ¶ 12. Dovex’s (and Auvil’s) counsel argue that
18 because the Washington Supreme Court did not explicitly determine the scope of
19 the tasks included in “piece-rate picking work,” the claims of Dovex workers are
20 limited to the tasks the district court determines are outside of “piece-rate picking

1 work.” *Id.* Although Plaintiffs’ Counsel (here and in *Carranza*) strenuously argue
2 that the tasks at issue are clearly not part of “piece-rate picking work,” the fact that
3 Dovex is still making this argument suggests at least some risk remains for those
4 claims.

5 Furthermore, one of the primary disagreements during settlement
6 negotiations in this case was the amount of work time Auvil’s piece-rate workers
7 spent outside of piecework activities, and Plaintiffs faced the risk that a jury
8 would not accept their calculations.

9 In addition, Auvil has argued that it was not obligated to separately pay its
10 pieceworkers for rest breaks before the Washington Supreme Court decided that
11 issue in *Lopez Demetrio v. Sakuma Brothers Farms, Inc.*, 183 Wn.2d 649, 355
12 P.3d 258 (2015), seizing on the Court’s statement in *Lopez Demetrio* that “we
13 take no position on the retroactivity of this rule.” *Id.* at 659. Although Plaintiffs
14 strongly believe the *Lopez Demetrio* opinion applies retroactively, Auvil would
15 have pursued its argument absent a settlement.

16 Finally, Auvil has asserted that it accurately recorded all hours worked and
17 has vehemently denied that any unlawful conduct was willful.

18 The reality that Class Members could end up recovering a fraction of the
19 Settlement Agreement’s benefits at trial was significant enough to convince
20

1 Plaintiffs and their counsel that the Settlement reached with Auvil outweighs the
2 gamble and expense of further litigation.

3 2. The risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
4 litigation.

5 Litigation would be lengthy and expensive if this action were to proceed.
6 Indeed, the Class would have faced significant hurdles. Although the Washington
7 Supreme Court issued an opinion favorable to the workers in *Carranza* after the
8 settlement was reached, the risk remained at the time of settlement negotiations
9 that the Court could have sided with the employer. This would have left the Class
10 with no remedy at all for the minimum wage claim. Furthermore, as is evident
11 from the *Carranza* case, Auvil may have continued arguing it did not have to
12 separately compensate piece-rate workers for the activities at issue here had a
13 settlement not been reached.

14 Even if Plaintiffs could prove Auvil failed to properly pay them for
15 compensable non-productive work time, Auvil has forcefully argued that any
16 damages award would be minimal because the non-productive work time was
17 allegedly minimal. If Auvil were able to convince a jury that Plaintiffs'
18 allegations were overstated or unfounded, Auvil could have reduced the
19 recoverable damages—or eliminated them altogether.

20 With respect to the rest break claim, Plaintiffs would be left with no
remedy if it were determined that *Lopez Demetrio* did not apply retroactively.

1 And with respect to the timekeeping claims, Auvil has asserted that it has
2 recorded and paid for all hours worked. Significant litigation on this issue
3 loomed for the parties.

4 In sum, further litigation would have been expensive, complex, and
5 lengthy. In the end, the parties would have conducted a lengthy, expensive jury
6 trial that would have entailed many Spanish-speaking witnesses, requiring
7 interpreting services. In Plaintiffs' counsel's experience, trials in cases like this
8 can take five weeks or longer and can arouse prejudices and biases that are
9 difficult to overcome. *See Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors*, 168 Wn.2d 664, 672, 230
10 P.3d 583 (2010) ("Issues involving immigration can inspire passionate responses
11 that carry a significant danger of interfering with the fact finder's duty to engage
12 in reasoned deliberation.").

13 Auvil almost certainly would have appealed any judgment in Plaintiffs'
14 favor, and Class Members would likely not have received any relief for years.
15 This Settlement avoids these risks and provides immediate and certain relief to
16 Qualified Class Members.

17 3. The risk of maintaining class action status through trial.

18 Although Plaintiffs are confident they would have obtained class
19 certification, Auvil would have strenuously opposed a class certification motion.
20 Even if a class were certified on a contested motion, Auvil likely would have

1 moved to decertify after the close of discovery. While Plaintiffs anticipate the
2 Court would have granted class certification, there was nevertheless a continued
3 risk to maintaining class certification.

4 4. The amount offered in settlement.

5 The Settlement Agreement requires Auvil to pay \$2,500,000. This appears
6 to be the largest farm worker wage and hour class action settlement on record in
7 Washington. Cote Decl., ¶ 13. The Common Fund Payment will be used to pay
8 Qualified Class Members after deducting attorneys' fees, costs, settlement
9 administration expenses, and Class representative service awards. If the Court
10 approves the requested attorneys' fees, costs, settlement administration expenses,
11 and Class representative service awards, the remaining \$1,795,933.77 will be
12 distributed to Qualified Class Members. *See* ECF No. 48 at 20–21 & Cote Decl.,
13 ¶ 7.

14 The amount of each Qualified Class Member's award will be based on the
15 Member's aggregate proportional share of the Net Class Fund as split between the
16 Rest Break Portion (40%) and the Minimum Wage and AWPA Portion (60%).¹
17 *See* ECF No. 48 at 21. All Class Members who submit Claim Forms will likely

18
19 ¹ These allocations are based on calculations of the total potential damages for
20 each claim. Cote Decl., ¶ 14.

1 receive between approximately 132% and 151% of their estimated actual
2 damages. Cote Decl., ¶ 6. These percentages are substantially above the
3 percentage recoveries obtained in settlements approved by other courts. *See, e.g.,*
4 *Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (approving
5 settlement amounting to 30% of the damages estimated by the class expert); *In re*
6 *Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (approving a
7 settlement estimated to be worth between 1/6 and 1/2 of the plaintiffs' estimated
8 loss); *In re Omnivision Tech., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
9 (approving settlement amounting to 9% of estimated total damages).

10 Finally, there will be no reversion to Auvil under any circumstances. ECF
11 No. 48 at 30.

12 5. The extent of discovery completed and stage of proceedings.

13 This case settled after extensive, focused discovery that included Auvil's
14 production of 116,671 pages of documents and data. Class Counsel reviewed
15 thousands of pages of documents, analyzed the electronic data, and engaged in
16 several meet-and-confer calls regarding discovery disputes, ultimately resolving
17 most of those disputes without Court intervention. ECF No. 48 at 2–3. Entering
18 mediation, both parties were well informed about the strengths and weaknesses of
19 the case, and a settlement was reached after months of negotiations that followed
20 formal mediation. *Id.*

1 6. The experience of counsel.

2 Where Class Counsel is qualified and well informed, their opinion that a
3 settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate is entitled to significant weight. *See*
4 *Pelletz v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*, 255 F.R.D. 537, 543 (W.D. Wash. 2009). Here,
5 Class Counsel are highly experienced class action litigators. ECF No. 48 at
6 ¶¶19–24; Cote Decl., ¶¶ 15–17, 26; Declaration of Toby J. Marshall in Support of
7 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval (“Marshall Decl.”), ¶¶ 10–20. They have
8 achieved significant successes for low-wage workers, including farm workers, in
9 wage and hour class actions like this one. For example, Class Counsel Marc Cote
10 and Toby Marshall represented the workers in *Lopez Demetrio*, where their work
11 resulted in a unanimous Washington Supreme Court opinion in favor of the
12 workers. ECF No. 48 at ¶ 22. Class Counsel are also Plaintiffs’ counsel in
13 *Carranza*, where their work again resulted in a Washington Supreme Court
14 opinion in favor of the workers. *Id.* at ¶ 23; Cote Decl., ¶ 12. Based on their
15 experience, Class Counsel believe the proposed settlement is an excellent result
16 for the Class. Cote Decl., ¶ 17.

17 7. The presence of a governmental participant.

18 Pursuant to CAFA, Auvil notified the United States Attorney General and
19 the attorneys’ general of all states in which any Class Member resides. *See* Cote
20

1 Decl., ¶ 8. Not a single government entity has objected to the settlement or
2 sought to intervene. Thus, this factor supports settlement approval.

3 8. The reaction of Class Members.

4 A positive response to a settlement—as evidenced by a small percentage of
5 objections and opt-outs—supports final approval. *See Pelletz*, 255 F.R.D. at 543–
6 44; *Tadepalli v. Uber Techs., Inc.*, No. 15-CV-04348-MEJ, 2016 WL 1622881, at
7 *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016) (quoting *In re Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1043)
8 (observing “the absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class action
9 settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class
10 settlement action are favorable to the class members”). To date, no Class
11 Members have objected to the Settlement. Only one Class Member has requested
12 exclusion, and he did so pursuant to an individual settlement involving the same
13 claims. Cote Decl., ¶ 11.

14 The deadline for objecting or opting out of the Settlement is September 10,
15 2018. Plaintiffs intend to file a supplemental brief to update this information and
16 respond to any objections by September 24, 2018.

17 **B. Class Members received the best notice practicable.**

18 In preliminarily approving the Settlement, this Court determined that the
19 notice program meets the requirements of due process and applicable law,
20 constitutes the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and is due and

1 sufficient notice to all individuals entitled thereto. ECF No. 53 at 8. The notice
2 program was fully implemented by Simpluris with the assistance of Class
3 Counsel and Auvil. *See generally* Simpluris Decl.

4 The class notice adequately informed Class Members of the nature of the
5 action and these proceedings, the terms of the settlement, the effect of the action
6 and release of claims, and the process to submit a Claim Form to share in the
7 settlement proceeds, to exclude themselves from the action, or to object to the
8 settlement, as required for final approval under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9 23 and in compliance with *In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 618 F.3d
10 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2010).

11 The notice program successfully reached Class Members. Simpluris
12 estimates that mailed notice has reached over 89% of Class Members. Simpluris
13 Decl., ¶ 8. The actual percentage of Class Members who received notice is
14 believed to be even higher because many additional Class Members likely learned
15 of the settlement through the text messaging campaign, the Facebook campaign,
16 the settlement website, the radio announcements Class Counsel purchased, the
17 notices posted at Auvil’s orchards and offices, and word of mouth. According to
18 the experienced Settlement Administrator, the notice program “constitutes the
19 best notice practicable and satisfies due process.” Simpluris Decl., ¶ 13.

1 **C. This Court should approve late claims submitted by October 31,**
2 **2018.**

3 “Until the fund created by the settlement is actually distributed, the court
4 retains its traditional equity powers” over the class settlement plan, including the
5 authority to approve “late claims.” *See Zients v. LaMorte*, 459 F.2d 628, 630-31
6 (2d Cir. 1972) (allowing untimely claimants to receive payments from settlement
7 fund); *see also In re Gypsum Antitrust Cases*, 565 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.
8 1977) (citing *Zients* in support of conclusion “that the district court had discretion
9 to grant late claims”). To ensure all Class Members have an adequate opportunity
10 to submit Claim Forms, including those Class Members who were sent settlement
11 notices in August after Defendant had inadvertently omitted them from the initial
12 Class list, Plaintiffs request that this Court allow any late Claim Forms received
13 by the Settlement Administrator by October 31, 2018 to be accepted as timely.

14 **D. The proposed service awards are reasonable.**

15 The requested service awards, which promote the public policy of
16 encouraging individuals to undertake the responsibility of representative lawsuits,
17 should be approved. *See Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 958–59 (finding service awards
18 are appropriate to “compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of
19 the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the
20 action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney
general”). Plaintiffs request service awards of \$10,000 each for Class

1 representatives Juan Barrientos Martinez and Jesus Martinez Gutierrez, both of
2 whom assisted counsel, provided important information, attended mediation,
3 participated in settlement negotiations, and were prepared to testify at trial. ECF
4 No. 48 at 17.

5 Plaintiffs' requested service awards are appropriate and in line with awards
6 approved by other courts. *See, e.g., Pelletz*, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1329–30 & n.9
7 (approving \$7,500 service awards and collecting decisions approving awards
8 ranging from \$5,000 to \$40,000).

9 **E. The settlement administration expenses award is reasonable.**

10 The Settlement Agreement also provides for a Settlement Administration
11 Expenses Award not to exceed \$49,000. ECF No. 48 at 24. For a settlement of
12 this size—with over 4,000 Class members—\$49,000 in settlement administration
13 expenses from the common fund is reasonable, particularly in light of the work
14 required to establish a Qualified Settlement Fund; create a settlement website
15 with an online claim form; format settlement notices; mail notices to Class
16 Members; manually send text message notice to all Class Members for whom
17 telephone numbers are available; put together a Facebook advertisement
18 campaign targeting potential Class Members; process claims received online, by
19 mail, and at Auvil's offices; process and mail settlement payments; and handle
20 tax reporting duties. The administration expenses to be paid from the common

1 fund are reasonable and necessary to inform Class Members of the Settlement,
2 process claims, and ensure the settlement is administered fairly. Thus, Plaintiffs
3 request approval of a Settlement Administration Expenses Award not to exceed
4 \$49,000, with any remainder included in the Net Class Fund for distribution to
5 Class Members.

6 **F. The payment of attorneys’ fees at the benchmark level is fair and
7 reasonable.**

8 “Attorneys’ fees provisions included in proposed class action settlement
9 agreements are, like every other aspect of such agreements, subject to the
10 determination whether the settlement is ‘fundamentally fair, adequate, and
11 reasonable.’” *Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d 938, 963 (9th Cir 2003) (quoting
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)). When state substantive law applies to plaintiffs’ claims,
13 attorneys’ fees are to be awarded in accordance with state law. *Vizcaino v.*
14 *Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). Because Washington law
15 governs the central claims in the case, attorneys’ fees must be awarded in
16 accordance with Washington law. *Id.*

17 “Under Washington law, the percentage-of-recovery approach is used in
18 calculating fees in common fund cases.” *Id.* (citing *Bowles v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys.*,
19 121 Wn.2d 52, 72, 847 P.2d 440 (1993)). As the Washington Supreme Court has
20 held, “[i]n common fund cases, the size of the recovery constitutes a suitable
measure of the attorneys’ performance.” *Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 72; *see also*

1 *Lyzanchuk v. Yakima Ranches Owners Ass'n, Phase II, Inc.*, 73 Wn. App. 1, 12
2 (1994) (“Under the percentage of recovery approach . . . attorneys are
3 compensated according to the size of the benefit conferred, not the actual hours
4 expended.”). Because this is a common fund settlement, the “percentage of
5 recovery approach” applies. *See Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 73; *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at
6 1047.

7 Public policy supports this approach. “When attorney fees are available to
8 prevailing class action plaintiffs, plaintiffs will have less difficulty obtaining
9 counsel and greater access to the judicial system. Little good comes from a
10 system where justice is available only to those who can afford its price.” *Bowles*,
11 121 Wn.2d at 71.

12 Although district courts in the Ninth Circuit have discretion in common
13 fund cases to perform a lodestar cross-check, the “primary basis of the fee award
14 remains the percentage method.” *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1047, 1050–51 (affirming
15 attorney fee award of 28% of the common fund, which represented a lodestar
16 multiplier of 3.65). The Ninth Circuit and district courts in this Circuit have
17 recognized that the percentage-of-recovery method is the appropriate method for
18 calculating fees where, as here, counsel’s effort has created a common fund. *See*,
19 *e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir.
20 2011) (“Because the benefit to the class is easily quantified in common-fund

1 settlements, we have allowed courts to award attorneys a percentage of the
2 common fund in lieu of the often more time-consuming task of calculating the
3 lodestar.”); *Ikuseghan v. Multicare Health Sys.*, Case No. C14-5539 BHS, 2016
4 WL 4363198, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2016) (finding percentage-of-
5 recovery method is appropriate and awarding 30% of settlement fund). “This
6 method aligns the interests of counsel and the class by allowing class counsel to
7 directly benefit from increasing the size of the class fund.” *Craft v. Cnty. Of San*
8 *Bernardino*, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2008).

9 Here, Class Counsel seek the standard, benchmark amount of 25% of the
10 common fund for attorneys’ fees. This amount is reasonable under the
11 percentage-of-recovery approach, and a lodestar cross-check also demonstrates
12 the reasonableness of the fee award.

13 1. Class Counsel’s fee request is reasonable under the percentage-of-
14 recovery approach.

15 The “benchmark” for a percentage fee award is “25 percent of the recovery
16 obtained.” *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1047 (quoting *Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 72–73)
17 (noting “Ninth Circuit cases echo this approach”). Generally, “fees of less than
18 25% will be awarded in megafund cases (cases of \$50 million or more),” while
19 “[c]ases of under \$10 million will often result in fees above 25%.” *Craft*, 624 F.
20 Supp. 2d at 1127.

1 Here, Class Counsel request approval of the benchmark amount. Because
2 the fee request is for exactly 25%, it is reasonable under the “percentage-of-
3 recovery” method. *Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 72–73. Only in “special
4 circumstances” is the benchmark figure “adjusted upward or downward.” *Id.*

5 Class Members received settlement notices stating the amount and
6 percentage of fees Class Counsel requested. *See* ECF No. 48 at 37, 39. To date,
7 no Class Member has objected to the fee request. Cote Decl., ¶ 10.

8 A 25% benchmark fee is appropriate in light of the circumstances of this
9 case. In *Vizcaino*, the court considered the following factors in upholding a 28%
10 fee: (1) whether counsel achieved exceptional results for the class; (2) the level of
11 risk; (3) whether counsel’s performance generated benefits beyond the cash
12 settlement fund; (4) whether the percentage rate is at or below the market rate;
13 and (5) whether the case was litigated on a contingency basis, required counsel to
14 incur costs, and required counsel to forgo other work. *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at
15 1048–50.

16 All of the *Vizcaino* factors support approval of the requested fee award.
17 First, in determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to award, a court should
18 examine the degree of success obtained. *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1048
19 (“Exceptional results are a relevant circumstance.”); *Manual for Complex*
20 *Litigation (Fourth)* § 21.71 (the “fundamental focus is the result actually achieved

1 for class members”). Class Counsel achieved exceptional results for the Class. In
2 addition to non-monetary benefits and future policy changes to ensure
3 compensation for non-piecework hours, Qualified Class Members are expected to
4 receive more than 100% of the wages owed and AWPA damages available to
5 them. Cote Decl., ¶ 6. This is a better result than Qualified Class Members could
6 obtain by litigating the case through trial.

7 Second, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that the public interest is served by
8 rewarding attorneys who assume representation on a contingent basis to
9 compensate them for the risk that they might be paid nothing at all for their work.
10 *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 (explaining that courts reward successful class counsel
11 in contingency cases “for taking the risk of nonpayment by paying them a
12 premium over their normal hourly rates for winning contingency cases”). This
13 was a risky case for Class Counsel. At the beginning of the case, Auvil asserted
14 “there is no Washington case law that recognizes the existence” of Plaintiffs’
15 theory for recovery of separate compensation for work performed outside of
16 productive piecework activities. ECF No. 12 at 19. Auvil maintained it already
17 paid for all hours worked through workweek averaging and said Plaintiffs’
18 arguments raised “questionable liability theories” and “a novel issue of first
19 impression.” *Id.*; ECF No. 13 at 5–6. Auvil also forcefully argued that the
20 requirement to separately pay piece-rate employees for rest breaks was only the

1 law after *Lopez Demetrio* was decided but not before. *Id.* at 21. If this Court had
2 accepted Auvil’s position, Plaintiffs’ rest break compensation claim for the pre-
3 *Lopez Demetrio* period would have been dismissed.

4 Class Counsel prosecuted this matter on a purely contingent basis, agreeing
5 to advance all necessary expenses and to receive a fee only if there was a
6 recovery. Counsel invested considerable time and money to vindicate the claims
7 of thousands of workers, with expenses totaling more than \$10,000. Cote Decl., ¶
8 28; Marshall Decl., ¶ 21. Class Counsel’s “substantial outlay, when there is a risk
9 that none of it will be recovered, supports the award of the requested fees” here.
10 *In re Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.

11 Third, Class Counsel’s performance generated benefits beyond the cash
12 settlement fund. In addition to negotiating the Common Fund Payment, Class
13 Counsel convinced Auvil to provide Class Members with compensation for non-
14 productive work on a going forward basis, beginning January 1, 2018, by paying
15 each piece-rate employee an additional amount of not less than 4.5% of the
16 employee’s piece-rate earnings each pay period. ECF No. 48 at 19. Furthermore,
17 through the Settlement, Class Counsel negotiated changes to Auvil’s timekeeping
18 practices so that each employee could record his or her exact start and stop time,
19 and Auvil agreed to eliminate rounding in half-hour intervals. *Id.* at 20. Finally,

1 Class Counsel negotiated a requirement that Auvil provide wage and hour law
2 training for all orchard managers and crew bosses. *Id.*

3 The fourth factor looks at whether the requested percentage rate is at or
4 below the market rate. Contingency fee percentages in individual cases are
5 usually in the range of 33 to 40%. *See Forbes v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. W.*, 170
6 Wn.2d 157, 161-66, 240 P.3d 790 (2010) (discussing contingency fee percentages
7 between 33.33% and 44% and reinstating trial court’s order that “40 percent
8 contingency fee based on the \$5 million settlement was fair and reasonable”).

9 The typical range for attorneys’ fees awarded in common fund class action
10 settlements is between 20 and 33%. *Alba Conte et al.*, 4 *Newberg on Class*
11 *Actions* § 14.6 (4th ed. 2002) (recognizing “fee awards in class actions average
12 around one-third of the recovery”). State and federal courts regularly approve
13 percentage awards of 30% or more for common fund settlements. *See, e.g.*,
14 *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1047, 1050–51 (affirming attorney fee award of 28% of the
15 common fund); *In re Mego*, 213 F.3d 457, 463 (9th Cir. 2000 (affirming award of
16 33% of common fund); *In re Pacific Enterprises Sec. Litig.*, 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th
17 Cir. 1995) (affirming award equal to 33% of fund); *Ikuseghan*, 2016 WL
18 4363198, at *2 (awarding 30% of common fund); *Hageman v. AT&T Mobility*
19 *LLC*, No. CV 13-50-BLG-RWA, 2015 WL 9855925, at *4 (D. Mont. Feb. 11,
20 2015) (approving common fund percentage fee of 33%, or \$15 million, from the

1 common fund of \$45 million); *Vandervort v. Balboa Capital Corp.*, 8 F. Supp. 3d
2 1200, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (awarding 33% of fund); *Vasquez v. Coast Valley*
3 *Roofing, Inc.*, 266 F.R.D. 482, 492 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing five recent wage and
4 hour class actions where federal district courts approved attorney fee awards
5 ranging from 30 to 33%); *Singer v. Becton Dickinson & Co.*, No. 08-CV-821-IEG
6 (BLM), 2010 WL 2196104, at *8–9 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 1, 2010) (approving attorney
7 fee award of 33.33% of the common fund and noting that typical range is 20% to
8 50% for similar wage and hour class actions); *Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods,*
9 *Inc.*, No. 1:05CV0484 DLB, 2007 WL 3492841, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2007)
10 (“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the
11 lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of
12 the recovery” (citing 4 Newberg & Conte, *Newberg on Class Actions* § 14.6 (4th
13 ed. 2007))).

14 Although a 25% common fund fee is the “benchmark,” it is below the
15 market rate for attorneys’ fees in common fund cases. *See Craft*, 624 F. Supp. 2d
16 at 1124–25 (citing study showing attorneys’ fees in class actions averaged
17 approximately 32% of the recovery and recognizing that “25% is substantially
18 below the average class fund fee nationally”). Thus, the market rate factor shows
19 that a 25% fee is reasonable here.

1 Fifth and finally, Class Counsel litigated this case on a contingency basis,
2 incurring substantial costs and forgoing significant other work. Cote Decl., ¶¶ 18,
3 28; Marshall Decl., ¶¶ 9, 21.

4 In sum, a benchmark fee award of 25% of the common fund is reasonable
5 and appropriate in light of the exceptional results achieved, the risks inherent in
6 the case, the benefits beyond the cash settlement fund, the fact that the “market
7 rate” for class action fees is higher, and the fact that this contingency fee case has
8 required counsel to forego other work. *See Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1049–50. Thus,
9 Class Counsel respectfully request that this Court approve a 25% fee.

10 2. A lodestar cross-check confirms the requested fee is reasonable.

11 In the Ninth Circuit, courts may use a rough calculation of the lodestar as a
12 crosscheck to assess the reasonableness of an award based on the percentage
13 method. *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1050 (“[W]hile the primary basis of the fee award
14 remains the percentage method, the lodestar may provide a useful perspective on
15 the reasonableness of a given percentage award.”). The “percentage-of-recovery”
16 approach provides an independent ground for granting the fee request, but a
17 “cross-check” under the lodestar method also demonstrates that counsel’s request
18 is reasonable. *See id.* at 1050–51 & n.5 (cautioning that courts should reward
19 counsel who “achieved a timely result for class members in need of immediate
20 relief” and “the lodestar method creates incentives for counsel to expend more

1 hours than may be necessary on litigating a case so as to recover a reasonable fee,
2 since the lodestar method does not reward early settlement”).

3 Courts use a two-step process in applying the lodestar method. First, the
4 court calculates the “lodestar figure” by multiplying the number of hours
5 reasonably expended by a reasonable rate. *Moreno v. City of Sacramento*, 534
6 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008); *Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co.*, 100
7 Wn.2d 581, 597–99, 675 P.2d 193 (1983). Once the lodestar is determined, the
8 court may then enhance the lodestar with a multiplier, if necessary, to arrive at a
9 reasonable fee. *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 & n.6 (approving lodestar multiplier
10 of 3.65 and citing a survey of class settlements indicating most multipliers range
11 from 1.0 to 4.0). “This mirrors the established practice in the private legal market
12 of rewarding attorneys for taking the risk of nonpayment by paying them a
13 premium over their normal hourly rates for winning contingency cases.”

14 *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051.

- 15 i. Counsel have spent a reasonable number of hours on
16 this case.

17 Here, Class Counsel’s requested fee award of \$625,000 represents a modest
18 multiplier of approximately 2.2 on their current lodestar. Cote Decl., ¶ 21. Class
19 counsel have reasonably devoted over 870 hours to the investigation,
20 development, litigation, and resolution of this case, incurring over \$280,999.50 in
lodestar fees at current hourly rates through August 23, 2018 (not including fees

1 that will be incurred to see the case through final approval, ensure the settlement
2 is properly administered, and ensure Qualified Class Members receive their
3 settlement payments). *See* Cote Decl. ¶ 21; Marshall Decl., ¶¶ 4–5. This includes
4 time spent investigating the claims of the Class Members, conducting significant
5 discovery, researching and analyzing legal issues, briefing legal issues,
6 calculating damages, interviewing Class Members, participating in a Rule 34
7 inspection of Auvil orchards, preparing for mediation, engaging in settlement
8 negotiations, working with the Settlement Administrator, working on preliminary
9 approval briefing, and working on this final approval briefing. *See* Cote Decl.
10 ¶ 22, Ex. A; Marshall Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A.

11 Throughout this case, Class Counsel prosecuted the claims of the
12 employees efficiently and effectively. Knowing it was possible they would never
13 be paid for their work, counsel had no incentive to act in a manner that was
14 anything but economical. *See Moreno*, 534 F.3d at 1112 (“[L]awyers are not
15 likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency cases in the hope of inflating
16 their fees. The payoff is too uncertain, as to both the result and the amount of the
17 fee.”). That said, counsel took their charge seriously and endeavored to represent
18 the interests of the class members to the greatest extent possible. The work Class
19 Counsel performed was reasonable and necessary to ensure the successful
20 prosecution and settlement of this complex action.

1 ii. Counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable.

2 In the common fund context, the Ninth Circuit has instructed courts to
3 apply reasonable hourly rates for the *region* when conducting a lodestar analysis.
4 *Online DVD-Rental*, 779 F.3d at 949; *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 941. A district
5 court may not adopt an informal court-wide policy of “holding the line” on fees at
6 a certain level. *Moreno*, 534 F.3d at 1115. Counsel in this case practice
7 throughout the state in Washington using the same hourly rates they seek here.²
8 Cote Decl., ¶¶ 25–26.

9
10 ² Furthermore, rates outside the forum may be used if local counsel is “unwilling
11 or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or
12 specialization required to handle properly the case.” *Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin.*
13 *Servs.*, 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). Here,
14 Class Counsel are well known as committed advocates for farm workers
15 throughout the state, having achieved strong results for farm workers in other
16 class action cases. Class Counsel are unaware of any other attorneys in the
17 Eastern District of Washington with their level of expertise on class action cases
18 on behalf of immigrant farm workers other than attorneys for legal aid
19 organizations, and attorneys of Columbia Legal Services and Northwest Justice
20 Project have time limitations and practice restrictions that would have prevented

1 “Where the attorneys in question have an established rate for billing clients,
2 that rate will likely be a reasonable rate.” *Bowers*, 100 Wn.2d at 597; *see also*
3 *Broyles v. Thurston County*, 147 Wn. App. 409, 195 P.3d 985 (2008) (“The
4 presumptive reasonable hourly rate for an attorney is the rate the attorney
5 charges.”). Thus, in assessing the reasonableness of the rates requested by Class
6 Counsel, this Court should look at the rates Class Counsel charge hourly clients.

7 Courts regularly apply an attorney’s current rate for all work performed,
8 regardless of when the work was performed, as a means of compensating for the
9 delay in payment. *Steele v. Lundgren*, 96 Wn. App. 773, 785-86, 982 P.2d 619
10 (1999) (“Allowing such an adjustment encourages attorneys to take potentially
11 risky cases with clients who may not be able to afford to pay an attorney and
12 allows public interest lawyers to benefit as would attorneys in private practice.”);
13 *see also Gates v. Deukmejian*, 987 F.2d 1392, 1406 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A fee award
14 at current rates is intended to compensate prevailing attorneys for lost income

15 _____
16 them from litigating this case. Cote Decl., ¶ 27. Thus, even if Class Counsel’s
17 rates were found to be “outside-the-forum” rates, this Court should use these rates
18 for the lodestar cross-check because available local counsel lack the experience,
19 expertise, or specialization in farm worker class actions to achieve the results
20 Class Counsel achieved in this case.

1 they might have received through missed investment opportunities as well as lost
2 interest.”).

3 Here, Class Counsel’s lodestar calculations are based on reasonable hourly
4 rates. Class Counsel’s lodestar was calculated based on counsel’s current hourly
5 billing rates for similar matters, \$395 for Mr. Cote, \$475 for Mr. Marshall, and
6 \$450 for Sean Phelan. Cote Decl., ¶¶ 23–26; Marshall Decl., ¶¶ 5–7. These are
7 the rates that counsel charge clients paying by the hour and thus are
8 presumptively reasonable. *See Bowers*, 100 Wn.2d at 597.

9 Class counsel set their rates for attorneys and staff members based on a
10 variety of factors, including among others: the experience, skill and sophistication
11 required for the types of legal services typically performed; the rates customarily
12 charged in the markets where the legal services are typically performed; and the
13 experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys and staff members. *See Cote*
14 *Decl.* ¶ 24; *Marshall Decl.*, ¶ 6. The rates charged for attorneys and staff
15 members working on this matter range from \$75 to \$550 per hour, with the
16 majority of the work performed by Mr. Cote at his regular hourly rate of \$395.
17 *See Cote Decl.* ¶ 23; *Marshall Decl.*, ¶¶ 5–6.

18 Both state and federal courts have found rates significantly higher than
19 these were reasonable for work performed in Washington by attorneys of similar
20 skill, experience, and reputation. *Marshall Decl.*, ¶ 7.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

iii. A lodestar multiplier is appropriate.

Courts routinely enhance the lodestar “to reflect the risk of non-payment in common fund cases.” *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 (quoting *In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Secs. Litig.*, 19 F.3d 1291, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994)). This upward adjustment (or “multiplier”) to an attorney’s lodestar is often warranted based on the contingent nature of success or the quality of work performed. *See id.* at 1051 (approving multiplier of 3.65). A lodestar multiplier can also be based on the benefit obtained for the class or the complexity and novelty of the issues presented. *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 941–42.

A multiplier is appropriate here due to the contingent nature of success. As described above, this was a risky case for Class Counsel. When they agreed to represent Plaintiffs and the potential class on a contingency fee basis, counsel knew they were facing a substantial risk, but they strongly believed Plaintiffs’ claims had merit. While any class action is risky, this case presented substantial risks that could have resulted in a complete dismissal or an order denying class certification—eliminating the possibility of a recovery for thousands of workers. Counsel worked throughout the case for two years with no guarantee of being compensated for their time and effort even though there was a substantial risk of nonpayment. Based on the risks involved in this case, a multiplier is appropriate.

1 In addition to the risk factor, this Court has another independent ground for
2 application of a multiplier: the quality of work performed. Class Counsel
3 performed high-quality work, resulting in an excellent settlement for the Class.
4 Class Counsel succeeded by taking a strong, aggressive approach to discovery,
5 which resulted in production of thousands of relevant documents and data that
6 allowed them to analyze the value of the Class claims, and by patiently
7 negotiating a settlement that provided a meaningful remedy for all Qualified
8 Class Members. The quality of the work that led to this excellent settlement
9 warrants a multiplier.

10 Foremost among the considerations in determining the appropriateness of a
11 multiplier “is the benefit obtained for the class.” *In re Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at
12 941–42. Here, as described above, Class Counsel has obtained significant
13 benefits for Qualified Class Members, including settlement payment amounting
14 to well over 100% of the wages and AWPAs owing to them, additional
15 compensation for non-piecework activities, and non-monetary relief. The
16 tremendous benefits Class Counsel obtained for the workers warrants the
17 requested multiplier.

18 In the Ninth Circuit, multipliers “ranging from one to four are frequently
19 awarded.” *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 n.6. In *Vizcaino*, the court collected
20 dozens of class action fee awards and found that in 83% of the cases the lodestar

1 multiplier was between 1.0 and 4.0. *Id.* Courts find higher multipliers
2 appropriate when using the lodestar method as a cross-check for an award based
3 on the percentage method. *See, e.g., Steiner v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc.*, 248 F.
4 App’x 780, 783 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a multiplier of approximately 6.85 to be
5 “well within the range of multipliers that courts have allowed” when cross-
6 checking a fee based on a percentage of the fund); *Johnson v. Fujitsu Tech. &*
7 *Bus. of Am., Inc.*, No. 16-CV-03698-NC, 2018 WL 2183253, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
8 May 11, 2018) (finding a 4.375 multiplier to be reasonable in cross-checking a
9 fee of 25% of a settlement fund); *McCulloch v. Baker Hughes Inteq Drilling*
10 *Fluids, Inc.*, No. 1:16-cv-00157-DAD-JLT, 2017 WL 5665848, at *8 (E.D. Cal.
11 Nov. 27, 2017) (“awarding attorneys’ fees at a 25 percent benchmark of the
12 common fund would yield a lodestar multiplier of 3.95, which is within the range
13 of acceptable lodestar multipliers previously approved by this court and others”);
14 *Pan v. Qualcomm Inc.*, No. 16-CV-01885-JLS-DHB, 2017 WL 3252212, at *13
15 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2017) (finding a multiplier of 3.5 to be reasonable); *Craft*, 624
16 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (approving fee award yielding a multiplier of 5.2 and stating
17 “there is ample authority for such awards resulting in multipliers in this range or
18 higher”); *Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294, 298-99 (N.D. Cal.
19 1995) (finding that a multiplier of 3.6 was “well within the acceptable range” and
20 explaining that “[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common”); *see also Hillson v.*

1 *Kelly Servs. Inc.*, No. 2:15-cv-10803, 2017 WL 3446596, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
2 11, 2017) (finding a multiplier of 4 to be reasonable in cross-checking a fee of
3 25% of a settlement fund); *Maley v. Del Global Techs. Corp.*, 186 F. Supp. 2d
4 358, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding a “modest multiplier of 4.65 is fair and
5 reasonable” when cross-checking a fee of 33⅓% of the settlement fund); *Di*
6 *Giacamo v. Plains All Am. Pipeline*, No. Civ. A. H-99-4137, 2001 WL 34633373,
7 at *11 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2001) (finding a multiplier of 5.3 appropriate in cross-
8 checking a fee of 30% of the settlement fund).

9 The 25% benchmark fee of \$625,000 represents a modest multiplier of
10 approximately 2.2 on Class Counsel’s current lodestar. Cote Decl., ¶ 21. The
11 multiplier will be reduced by the hours Class Counsel expend to see this
12 settlement through final approval and ensure Qualified Class Members are
13 appropriately paid their settlement awards. Because this multiplier is well within
14 the range of reasonableness for percentage fee awards in common fund cases, this
15 Court should approve the requested fee. Indeed, not a single Class Members has
16 objected to the requested fee award.

17 **G. Reimbursement of Class Counsel’s litigation costs is reasonable.**

18 For common fund settlements, litigation costs are awarded in addition to
19 percentage fee awards. *See Bowles*, 121 Wn.2d at 70–74 (affirming common
20 fund fee award of \$1.5 million and costs award of \$17,000). “Reasonable costs

1 and expenses incurred by an attorney who creates or preserves a common fund
2 are reimbursed proportionately by those class members who benefit from the
3 settlement.” *In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig.*, 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D.
4 Cal. 1996). Here, Class Counsel have incurred approximately \$10,066.23 in
5 litigation expenses. Cote Decl., ¶ 28, Ex. B; Marshall Decl., ¶ 21, Ex. B. These
6 expenses include: (1) filing fees; (2) courier and service expenses; (3) computer
7 research expenses; (4) mediation expenses; (5) travel expenses; (6) copying costs;
8 and (7) radio advertisements to notify potential Class members of the settlement.
9 *Id.* The expenses were reasonable and necessary to secure the successful
10 resolution of this litigation and to notify potential Class Members of their right to
11 share in the settlement proceeds. *See In re Immune Response Sec. Litig.*, 497 F.
12 Supp. 2d 1166, 1177–78 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (finding costs such as filing fees,
13 photocopy costs, travel expenses, postage, online legal research fees, and
14 mediation expenses are relevant and necessary expenses in class action litigation).
15 Class Counsel anticipate incurring additional costs through the end of the case
16 related to travel for the final approval hearing and additional radio
17 announcements to notify Class Members of the Settlement. Cote Decl., ¶ 28, Ex.
18 B. Future costs are anticipated to be \$479.02. *Id.* Thus, Class Counsel request
19 reimbursement of \$10,066.23 in total costs. This is less than the estimated
20 amount stated in settlement notices issued to Class Members (\$15,000). The

1 remaining amount will be included in the settlement funds distributed to Qualified
2 Class Members.

3 Class Counsel advanced these costs without any guarantee that they would
4 ever be repaid and the costs were necessarily incurred. Thus, this Court should
5 approve reimbursement of the requested costs.

6 IV. CONCLUSION

7 The \$2.5 million common fund settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.
8 Moreover, it is appropriate for the Court to grant an award of 25% of the common
9 fund for attorneys' fees and \$10,066.23 for costs given the high-quality work
10 performed and successful result achieved. An award not to exceed \$49,000 for
11 settlement administrative expenses is also appropriate. Finally, service awards of
12 \$10,000 each are reasonable. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter
13 Plaintiffs' proposed Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

14 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this 27th day of August,
15 2018.

16 FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS LLP

17 By: /s/ Marc C. Cote, WSBA #39824

Marc C. Cote, WSBA #39824

18 Sean Phelan, WSBA #27866

705 Second Avenue, Suite 1200

Seattle, Washington 98104

19 Telephone: (206) 682-6711

Facsimile: (206) 682-0401

20 Email: mcote@frankfreed.com

Email: sphelan@frankfreed.com

TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC

By: /s/ Toby J. Marshall, WSBA #32726
Toby J. Marshall, WSBA #32726
936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
Seattle, Washington 98103-8869
Telephone: (206) 816-6603
Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
Email: tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Marc C. Cote, hereby certify that on August 27, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

Clay M. Gatens, WSBA #34102
Sally F. White, WSBA #49457
Devon A. Gray, WSBA #51485
JEFFERS, DANIELSON, SONN & AYLWARD, P.S.
Attorneys for Defendant
2600 Chester Kimm Road
P.O. Box 1688
Wenatchee, WA 98807-1688
Telephone: (509) 662-3685
Facsimile: (509) 662-2452
Email: clayg@jdsalaw.com
Email: sallyw@jdsalaw.com
Email: devong@jdsalaw.com

DATED this 27th day of August, 2018.

FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS LLP

By: /s/ Marc C. Cote, WSBA #39824

Marc C. Cote, WSBA #39824
705 Second Avenue, Suite 1200
Seattle, Washington 98104
Telephone: (206) 682-6711
Facsimile: (206) 682-0401
Email: mcote@frankfreed.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Class